* fix(quality): preserve cursor iteration and option validation Keep prefetched rows on ManagedCursor so partial loops and explicit fetches share one position, and stop existing iterators after close or retirement. Preserve chunked reads and native SQLite result lifetime on reexecution and errors. Catch OptionError before ValueError so legacy auto-tag requests receive the actual validation error. Remove the overwritten ViewerJS title option. Regression tests failed before the fixes for lost rows, reads after close/retirement, and misleading option errors. Focused Python checks pass; cursor checks also pass on Python 3.13 and 3.14. Refs #321. * fix(quality): make the test doubles legal raises and hashes The fake queue no longer raises an attribute that starts as None. The oversized kind records hashes instead of raising from __hash__, which also catches a hash that production code swallows. Hostile.__bool__ raises the TypeError a truth test may raise. * fix(quality): drop the extra saveCoverage argument * refactor(quality): remove assignments that are overwritten before use * refactor(quality): remove the remaining overwritten test assignments * refactor(quality): drop imports repeated inside functions * refactor(quality): give duplicate identity keys one shape * refactor(quality): name the unused job event loop variable * refactor(quality): release model gates in finally, not except BaseException * refactor(quality): end the job runners with an explicit return * refactor(quality): use the precise unittest asserts * refactor(quality): import unittest.mock one way in the tests * fix(quality): say why each empty except is safe, log the broad ones * refactor(quality): stop binding values the tests never read * refactor(quality): remove the unused preview aliases and tag page query * refactor(quality): remove re-exports nothing imports * refactor(quality): parenthesize deliberate string joins in lists * refactor(quality): remove unused JavaScript variables and imports * refactor(quality): use the precise assert in the model status test
217 lines
7.6 KiB
Python
217 lines
7.6 KiB
Python
"""The per-install secret behind the workspace's gallery scopes and cursors (#430).
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A page addresses a listed file as ``{root_index, root_scope, path}``. The root
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scope is an HMAC over the root's index and canonical path, so the server can
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refuse an action aimed at a root that was renumbered or replaced since the page
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listed it (``py/api/images.py`` ``_gallery_scope_error``). The listing's keyset
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cursors are MACed with a second key, so a forged position never reaches the
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sort code.
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Both keys used to be drawn per process, so every ComfyUI restart made every
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open workspace tab stale. They now derive from one random secret persisted in
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``workspace-scope.key`` beside the database (never in ``config.json`` and never
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in the database, so a backup or an export does not carry it). When the folder
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cannot hold it, the process falls back to a per-process secret, as before.
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Standard library only: a fresh process can derive the same scope without
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importing the API.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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import re
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import secrets
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import stat
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import time
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from typing import NamedTuple
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logger = logging.getLogger("prompt_manager.api")
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KEY_FILE_NAME = "workspace-scope.key"
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SECRET_BYTES = 32
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_HEX = re.compile(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{64}")
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# Bounded read: a valid file is 64 hex characters and a newline.
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_MAX_FILE_BYTES = 128
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_ROOT_SCOPE_PURPOSE = b"prompt-manager/gallery-root-scope/v1"
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_CURSOR_PURPOSE = b"prompt-manager/workspace-cursor/v1"
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_SCOPE_TAG = "prompt-manager-gallery-root-v1"
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_TEMP_PREFIX = f".{KEY_FILE_NAME}."
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_TEMP_SUFFIX = ".tmp"
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_STALE_TEMP_SECONDS = 60
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class WorkspaceKeys(NamedTuple):
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"""The derived keys; ``persisted`` is False for a per-process fallback."""
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root_scope: bytes
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cursor: bytes
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persisted: bool
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def _read(path: str) -> bytes | None:
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"""The secret in *path*, None when it is missing or not 64 hex characters.
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Raises OSError for anything but a missing file (a folder, no permission).
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"""
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try:
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with open(path, "rb") as handle:
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raw = handle.read(_MAX_FILE_BYTES + 1)
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except FileNotFoundError:
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return None
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try:
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text = raw.decode("ascii").strip()
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except UnicodeDecodeError:
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return b""
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return bytes.fromhex(text) if _HEX.fullmatch(text) else b""
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def _write_exclusive(path: str, secret: bytes) -> None:
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"""Create *path* (it must not exist) holding *secret*, owner-only, fsynced."""
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flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_BINARY", 0)
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descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
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try:
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with os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb") as handle:
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handle.write((secret.hex() + "\n").encode("ascii"))
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handle.flush()
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os.fsync(handle.fileno())
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except BaseException:
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_unlink(path)
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raise
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def _unlink(path: str) -> None:
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try:
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os.unlink(path)
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except OSError:
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# best effort cleanup; the next sweep removes a leftover temp
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pass
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def _sweep_temps(directory: str) -> None:
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"""Remove temp files a crashed first start left (older than a minute)."""
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try:
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names = os.listdir(directory)
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except OSError:
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return
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cutoff = time.time() - _STALE_TEMP_SECONDS
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for name in names:
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if name.startswith(_TEMP_PREFIX) and name.endswith(_TEMP_SUFFIX):
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path = os.path.join(directory, name)
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try:
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if os.stat(path).st_mtime < cutoff:
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os.unlink(path)
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except OSError:
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# best effort: a later sweep removes what this one could not
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pass
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def _tighten(path: str) -> None:
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"""On POSIX an existing key readable by group or others becomes 0o600."""
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if os.name != "posix":
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return # the file inherits the folder's ACL, as the database does
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try:
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if stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(path).st_mode) & 0o077:
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os.chmod(path, 0o600)
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except OSError:
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# best effort: the key still works with its old mode
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pass
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def _store(directory: str, path: str, secret: bytes, *, replace: bool) -> None:
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"""Publish *secret* at *path*; a new file never overwrites a concurrent winner.
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The secret is written to a temp file first. ``os.link`` then fails when
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*path* exists, so of two first starts exactly one file wins
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(FileExistsError for the other). A file system without hard links (FAT,
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some shares) creates *path* with ``O_EXCL`` instead. *replace* (a corrupt
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key) swaps the file with ``os.replace``; Windows refuses that while
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another process holds the file open, which the caller treats as unusable.
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"""
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temp = os.path.join(
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directory, f"{_TEMP_PREFIX}{secrets.token_hex(8)}{_TEMP_SUFFIX}"
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)
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_write_exclusive(temp, secret)
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try:
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if replace:
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os.replace(temp, path)
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return
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try:
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os.link(temp, path)
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except FileExistsError:
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raise
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except OSError:
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# Not atomic: a second first start reading mid-write would see a
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# corrupt key. Rare (two first starts on FAT or a share at once);
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# each process still uses the file it reads back.
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_write_exclusive(path, secret)
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finally:
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_unlink(temp)
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def load_install_secret(directory: str) -> bytes | None:
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"""The persisted secret of *directory*, created on first use; None if unusable.
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After any write the file is read back and its content is what counts, so
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processes racing on a first start end with the one secret on disk.
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"""
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path = os.path.join(directory, KEY_FILE_NAME)
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try:
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_sweep_temps(directory)
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current = _read(path)
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if current:
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_tighten(path)
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return current
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corrupt = current is not None
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try:
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_store(directory, path, secrets.token_bytes(SECRET_BYTES), replace=corrupt)
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except FileExistsError:
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pass # another process created it first: its file counts
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stored = _read(path)
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if not stored:
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raise OSError(f"{KEY_FILE_NAME} is not readable after it was written")
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if corrupt:
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logger.warning(
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f"{KEY_FILE_NAME} was not a valid key and was replaced; "
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"open workspace pages must refresh once"
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)
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return stored
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except OSError as exc:
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logger.warning(f"Could not use {KEY_FILE_NAME}: {exc.__class__.__name__}")
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return None
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def _derive(secret: bytes, purpose: bytes) -> bytes:
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return hmac.new(secret, purpose, hashlib.sha256).digest()
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def workspace_keys_for(db_path: str | None) -> WorkspaceKeys:
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"""The keys for the library whose database is *db_path* (blocking I/O)."""
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secret = None
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if isinstance(db_path, str) and db_path.strip() and db_path != ":memory:":
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secret = load_install_secret(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(db_path)))
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persisted = secret is not None
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if not persisted:
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logger.warning(
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"Workspace scopes use a per-process key: open workspace pages must "
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"refresh after a restart"
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)
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secret = secrets.token_bytes(SECRET_BYTES)
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return WorkspaceKeys(
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_derive(secret, _ROOT_SCOPE_PURPOSE),
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_derive(secret, _CURSOR_PURPOSE),
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persisted,
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)
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def gallery_root_scope(keys: WorkspaceKeys, canonical_root: str, index: int) -> str:
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"""The 64-hex scope of the root at *index* (its canonical path string)."""
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payload = json.dumps(
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[_SCOPE_TAG, index, canonical_root], separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False
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).encode("utf-8")
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return hmac.new(keys.root_scope, payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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