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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 MachinePainting
|
4f85fcadfa |
v1.1.0: Security hardening parity with DropSend (untested)
Mirrors the security architecture of ComfyUI_DropSendNode v1.1.x to close
the same vulnerability classes. The actual Google OAuth grant path is
unchanged from v1.0.1 (same Flow.from_client_config, same OOB redirect,
same fetch_token call), so existing users' OAuth setup continues to work.
What changed is the wrapper around it. Note: this release has not been
runtime-tested end to end; the security logic is a direct port of the
tested DropSend implementation.
Setup Node refactor:
- Removed google_client_id, google_client_secret, auth_code, and the
service-account JSON from INPUT_TYPES. They no longer enter
PromptServer.history, workflow JSON, PNG metadata, localStorage, or
copy-pasted nodes.
- Added a browser-only modal (web/drivesend_oauth.js) and a same-origin
POST route /drivesend/setup/stash for entry. Hardening: origin check,
live-WebSocket gate, per-IP rate limit, 32 KB body cap, JSON content
type lockdown, 60-second TTL, 32-entry capacity, lock-protected access.
- Added COMFYUI_DRIVESEND_ALLOW_SETUP=1 opt-in gate. Without it the node
refuses to write or clear credentials, blocking remote workflow
submitters from hijacking or wiping the operator's Drive connection.
- Removed plaintext stdout prints of GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID / GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET
/ GOOGLE_REFRESH_TOKEN / COMFYUI_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Replaced with a
redacted (last-4-chars) banner.
- WebSocket credential delivery is sid-targeted, never broadcast. Refuses
to send when client_id is None and surfaces a clear error. JS handler
verifies client_id matches api.clientId before rendering.
- Service-account JSON is entered via a textarea in the same modal,
base64-encoded into GOOGLE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON for delivery.
File-system hardening:
- .env and token.json now created via os.open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC,
0o600), race-free, instead of open('w') with default umask (0o644).
- Added safe_paths.py: clamps watch_folder to ComfyUI's output tree
(with COMFYUI_DRIVESEND_ALLOWED_WATCH_PATHS opt-in for additional
roots), rejects symlinks in event paths, validates Drive folder IDs.
- AutoUploader now runs every event path through safe_paths.is_safe_event_path.
Logging:
- Centralized logging in __init__.py with race-free 0o600 creation of
drivesend.log on the root logger. Removed module-level
logging.basicConfig duplicates from monitor_output.py, encrypt_file.py,
drivesend_uploader_node.py.
- Verified: no logger or print call in the codebase emits an access
token, refresh token, client secret, service-account JSON body, or
encryption key value.
.gitignore additions:
- token.json, client_secret.json, service_account.json (Google credential
caches, previously not ignored).
- Editor backups: *.bak, *.backup, *~, *.swp, *.swo, .idea/.
- Encrypted artifacts: *.enc.
- Stray credential material: *.key, *.pem, *.p12, *.pfx.
- .claude/, .pytest_cache/, .coverage, htmlcov/, build artifacts,
Thumbs.db, Desktop.ini.
README rewrite:
- Linear three-step structure (Google Cloud setup, Setup Node, AutoUploader).
- Cloud / Local / Service-Account sections for the Setup Node.
- Threat model section documenting all enforced protections.
- "Setup is disabled" and "Browser delivery refused" troubleshooting.
- No em dashes per project style.
Tests:
- tests/test_security.py with five regression tests covering: send_sync
is never called with sid=None for credential events; payload echoes
client_id for JS-side verification; .env file mode is exactly 0o600;
client_id pattern rejects malformed input; stash entries expire after
TTL. Tests run without google-auth, googleapiclient, or watchdog
installed via ghost modules.
Version: 1.0.1 -> 1.1.0
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