Setup Node refactor (the secret-bearing fields no longer exist on the
node at all):
• Removed app_key / app_secret / auth_code from INPUT_TYPES. The
Setup Node now exposes only storage_method, encryption_key_method,
and reconnect — none of which are credentials.
• Added a "Set credentials..." button on the node (LiteGraph button
widget installed via beforeRegisterNodeDef + onNodeCreated
prototype hook so it survives reload, drag-and-drop workflow
JSON, and PNG metadata restore).
• Click opens a browser-only modal with three <input type=password>
fields. Browser-native dot masking the whole time the user types
or pastes — no canvas-rendered plaintext, no shoulder-surf.
• Modal Save POSTs values to a new same-origin route
/dropsend/setup/stash and closes. setup() consumes the stash
entry on the next Queue (one-shot, keyed by client_id, 60-second
TTL, 32-entry cap with oldest-eviction).
• Architectural consequence: secrets never become widget values, so
they cannot enter saved workflow JSON, ComfyUI's localStorage
auto-save, PNG metadata, copy-pasted nodes, or PromptServer.history
(and therefore the unauthenticated /history HTTP endpoint).
Auto-curl auth flow (one-click second paste):
• After Run 1 prints the OAuth URL banner, setup() sends a
sid-targeted dropsend_credentials_needed WebSocket event.
• JS handler auto-opens the entry modal in the originating browser
so the user can paste auth_code as soon as Dropbox shows it,
without clicking the button between runs.
• Defense in depth: client_id is echoed in the WS payload and the
JS handler verifies it matches api.clientId before opening.
Security hardening on /dropsend/setup/stash:
• Same-origin enforcement: Origin header must match request.host.
Closes cross-origin CSRF from another browser tab even when an
attacker has sniffed a victim's client_id.
• Content-Type lockdown: rejects anything other than
application/json with HTTP 415. Closes the confused-deputy class
where form-encoded bodies could be parsed as JSON.
• Live-session check: client_id must correspond to an active
PromptServer.instance.sockets entry. Returns 403 otherwise.
Closes the stash-poisoning vector where an attacker who guesses
a victim's client_id could pre-populate credentials.
• Per-IP rate limit: 30 POSTs / 10-second sliding window, returns
429 over budget. Defense against stash-spam DoS attempting to
evict a legitimate user's entry.
• Body cap (32 KB), client_id regex validation, JSON parse errors
return 400, empty payloads dropped.
• Both rate-limit and live-session checks empirically verified via
curl smoke tests.
Reconnect now revokes the Dropbox refresh token at the source:
• reconnect=True populates DropboxAuthManager from os.environ and
calls reset(revoke_token=True).
• POST /2/auth/token/revoke with an 8-second timeout so a Dropbox
outage cannot hang the operator mid-reconnect. Local cleanup
proceeds regardless of revocation outcome.
• Revocation outcome is now logged at logger.error level (not just
print) and the failure message tells the operator to manually
disconnect at https://www.dropbox.com/account/connected_apps so
a silent revocation failure cannot leave a still-valid token at
Dropbox.
Logging:
• Single FileHandler attached to the root logger from __init__.py,
pointed at a plugin-relative dropsend.log. Replaces the four
duplicated logging.basicConfig() blocks in monitor_output.py /
encrypt_file.py / dropbox_upload.py / dropsend_uploader_node.py
that were dead code (basicConfig is a no-op once ComfyUI has
already configured root). Log records from every DropSend module
now actually persist to disk.
• Race-free creation: pre-create with os.open(O_CREAT | O_WRONLY |
O_APPEND, 0o600) before FileHandler attaches, follow-up chmod as
belt-and-suspenders. Closes the brief default-umask window
between FileHandler creating the file and post-hoc chmod.
• Rotation via RotatingFileHandler (5 MB per file, 3 backups, ~20
MB max). Bounds disk use on long-lived hosts.
• dropbox_auth_manager.py now has its own logger so revocation
successes/failures land in dropsend.log alongside stdout.
Tests (tests/ directory, unittest, no extra deps):
• test_safe_paths.py — 23 tests covering symlink rejection, path-
traversal rejection, allowlist behaviour, dropbox_dest validation
(NUL bytes, missing leading slash, parent-traversal segments),
and resolve_safe_watch_folder edge cases. safe_paths is the only
barrier between remote workflow inputs and arbitrary-file-read
on the host; this is regression coverage for that barrier.
• test_setup_node_security.py — static AST analysis of
dropsend_setup_node.py asserting that every send_sync call for a
credential event passes a non-None sid AND sits inside an
"if sid:" guard. Catches future regressions of the original
WebSocket-broadcast vulnerability deterministically. Also asserts
INPUT_TYPES never re-introduces app_key/app_secret/auth_code.
WebSocket-broadcast guard maintained on all three event sites
(dropsend_credentials_ready, dropbox_reconnect_complete,
dropsend_credentials_needed) — refuse to send when client_id is None
to prevent send_sync(..., None) from broadcasting credentials to
every connected browser tab.
README:
• New Changelog section documenting the v1.1.0 security advisory
(workflow-persistence + WS-broadcast leaks in earlier versions)
and the fixes shipped in this release.
• New "Bind ComfyUI to localhost or front it with auth" Best
Practice item (item 4) explicitly calling out that ComfyUI's
/prompt endpoint is unauthenticated.
• New "Encryption key rotation" subsection covering symmetric-key
implications, leaked-key recovery, and how to generate a new key.
• New "Uninstalling / disconnecting" subsection with step-by-step
instructions for revoking Dropbox app, resetting app secret,
removing platform secrets, and handling existing .enc files.
• Threat model reflects same-origin/Content-Type checks, log
rotation, plugin-directory metadata-leak note for multi-tenant
hosts, reconnect-revocation silent-failure note, and Dropbox
SDK error-message log review.
.gitignore:
• Expanded to cover *.bak, *.enc, *.key/.pem/.p12/.pfx, .idea/,
.pytest_cache/, build artifacts, Thumbs.db/Desktop.ini.
Bundled in this minor release:
• Single-Observer fix for the macOS _fsevents conflict that
previously prevented .enc files from being picked up by the
upload watcher.
• folder_format dropdown for AutoUploader (project_name default
plus five worldwide date formats), with two-base persistence so
switching between project-name and dated modes preserves both
patterns.
• RUNNING banner with per-setting plain-English explanations.
• Branded watching/encrypted/sent log emojis.
• Per-shell copy-paste commands and echo verification for the
COMFYUI_DROPSEND_ALLOW_SETUP gate.
190 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
190 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
# dropbox_auth_manager.py
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import os
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import logging
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import requests
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import json
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class DropboxAuthManager:
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def __init__(self, app_key=None, app_secret=None, refresh_token=None):
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self.app_key = app_key
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self.app_secret = app_secret
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self.refresh_token = refresh_token
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def _get_credentials_file_path(self):
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"""Path to a legacy JSON credential file from older versions.
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The current code never writes this file — credentials live in
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`.env` (or are delivered to the browser via WebSocket and never
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touch disk). The path is kept only so reset() can clean up a
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stale file left over from earlier installs.
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"""
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plugin_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
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return os.path.join(plugin_dir, ".dropbox_credentials.json")
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def is_connected(self):
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return bool(self.app_key and self.app_secret and self.refresh_token)
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def exchange_auth_code_raw(self, auth_code, redirect_uri=None):
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"""Exchange auth code for tokens without storing them"""
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if not (self.app_key and self.app_secret):
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raise ValueError("App key and secret must be set before exchanging auth code.")
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data = {
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"code": auth_code,
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"grant_type": "authorization_code",
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"client_id": self.app_key,
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"client_secret": self.app_secret
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}
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# Include redirect_uri if it was used in the authorization request
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if redirect_uri:
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data["redirect_uri"] = redirect_uri
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headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
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# Do not log `data` or `response.text` here — both contain secrets
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# (client_secret, refresh_token, access_token). On platforms that
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# capture stdout (RunPod, Docker, CI) those would land in shared logs.
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response = requests.post("https://api.dropbox.com/oauth2/token", headers=headers, data=data)
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print(f"[DropboxAuthManager] Token exchange response status: {response.status_code}")
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# If 400 error, try without redirect_uri. This handles cases where
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# the auth code was obtained without a callback URL.
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if response.status_code == 400 and redirect_uri:
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print("[DropboxAuthManager] 400 with redirect_uri, retrying without it")
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data_without_redirect = {
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"code": auth_code,
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"grant_type": "authorization_code",
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"client_id": self.app_key,
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"client_secret": self.app_secret
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}
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response = requests.post("https://api.dropbox.com/oauth2/token", headers=headers, data=data_without_redirect)
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print(f"[DropboxAuthManager] Retry response status: {response.status_code}")
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response.raise_for_status()
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return response.json()
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def get_access_token(self):
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if not self.is_connected():
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raise RuntimeError("Dropbox not connected. Please run authentication first.")
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data = {
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"refresh_token": self.refresh_token,
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"grant_type": "refresh_token",
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"client_id": self.app_key,
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"client_secret": self.app_secret
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}
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headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
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response = requests.post("https://api.dropbox.com/oauth2/token", headers=headers, data=data)
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response.raise_for_status()
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access_token = response.json().get("access_token")
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if not access_token:
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raise RuntimeError("Failed to retrieve access token.")
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return access_token
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def reset(self, revoke_token=True):
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"""Clear stored tokens and optionally revoke authorization with Dropbox"""
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if revoke_token:
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# Revoke the token with Dropbox if we have it in memory.
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# The legacy auto-load from .dropbox_credentials.json is gone;
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# callers that want to revoke must construct this manager with
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# creds (or set them) before calling reset(revoke_token=True).
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if self.refresh_token and self.app_key and self.app_secret:
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try:
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print("[DropboxAuthManager] Revoking token with Dropbox...")
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# Get current access token to revoke
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access_token = self.get_access_token()
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# Revoke the token with Dropbox
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revoke_data = {
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"token": access_token
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}
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headers = {
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
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"Content-Type": "application/json"
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}
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response = requests.post(
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"https://api.dropboxapi.com/2/auth/token/revoke",
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headers=headers,
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json=revoke_data,
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# Bound the wait so a Dropbox outage or DNS
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# failure doesn't hang the user mid-reconnect.
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# Local-cleanup is the priority here; the
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# token-revoke is best-effort (and Dropbox
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# tokens expire on their own anyway).
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timeout=8,
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)
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if response.status_code == 200:
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msg = "[DropboxAuthManager] Token successfully revoked with Dropbox"
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print(msg)
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logger.info(msg)
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else:
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# Don't log response.text — it can echo the access token on some failures.
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msg = (
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f"[DropboxAuthManager] Token revocation FAILED at Dropbox "
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f"(HTTP {response.status_code}). The refresh token may still "
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f"be valid. Manually disconnect at "
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f"https://www.dropbox.com/account/connected_apps to be sure."
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)
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print(msg)
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logger.error(msg)
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except Exception as e:
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# Common case: Dropbox unreachable, refresh token already
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# invalidated, or get_access_token() couldn't mint one.
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# Local cleanup proceeds, but the operator needs to know
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# the token may still be live at Dropbox.
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msg = (
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f"[DropboxAuthManager] Token revocation FAILED locally: {e}. "
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f"The refresh token may still be valid at Dropbox. Manually "
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f"disconnect at https://www.dropbox.com/account/connected_apps."
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)
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print(msg)
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logger.error(msg)
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else:
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print("[DropboxAuthManager] Skipping token revocation (revoke_token=False)")
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# Clear credentials file
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try:
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credentials_path = self._get_credentials_file_path()
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if os.path.exists(credentials_path):
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os.remove(credentials_path)
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print(f"[DropboxAuthManager] Removed credentials file: {credentials_path}")
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except Exception as e:
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print(f"[DropboxAuthManager] Could not remove credentials file: {e}")
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# Clear instance variables
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self.app_key = None
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self.app_secret = None
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self.refresh_token = None
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def get_oauth_url(self, redirect_uri=None, state=None, force_reapprove=False):
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"""Generate OAuth URL for initial authorization"""
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if not self.app_key:
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raise ValueError("App key must be set to generate OAuth URL.")
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url = f"https://www.dropbox.com/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id={self.app_key}&token_access_type=offline"
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if redirect_uri:
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url += f"&redirect_uri={redirect_uri}"
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if state:
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url += f"&state={state}"
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# Force reapproval to ensure user sees authorization screen
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if force_reapprove:
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url += "&force_reapprove=true"
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return url
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