Files
MachinePainting 09362f42c7 v1.1.0: refactor Setup Node, security hardening, auto-curl auth flow
Setup Node refactor (the secret-bearing fields no longer exist on the
node at all):
  • Removed app_key / app_secret / auth_code from INPUT_TYPES. The
    Setup Node now exposes only storage_method, encryption_key_method,
    and reconnect — none of which are credentials.
  • Added a "Set credentials..." button on the node (LiteGraph button
    widget installed via beforeRegisterNodeDef + onNodeCreated
    prototype hook so it survives reload, drag-and-drop workflow
    JSON, and PNG metadata restore).
  • Click opens a browser-only modal with three <input type=password>
    fields. Browser-native dot masking the whole time the user types
    or pastes — no canvas-rendered plaintext, no shoulder-surf.
  • Modal Save POSTs values to a new same-origin route
    /dropsend/setup/stash and closes. setup() consumes the stash
    entry on the next Queue (one-shot, keyed by client_id, 60-second
    TTL, 32-entry cap with oldest-eviction).
  • Architectural consequence: secrets never become widget values, so
    they cannot enter saved workflow JSON, ComfyUI's localStorage
    auto-save, PNG metadata, copy-pasted nodes, or PromptServer.history
    (and therefore the unauthenticated /history HTTP endpoint).

Auto-curl auth flow (one-click second paste):
  • After Run 1 prints the OAuth URL banner, setup() sends a
    sid-targeted dropsend_credentials_needed WebSocket event.
  • JS handler auto-opens the entry modal in the originating browser
    so the user can paste auth_code as soon as Dropbox shows it,
    without clicking the button between runs.
  • Defense in depth: client_id is echoed in the WS payload and the
    JS handler verifies it matches api.clientId before opening.

Security hardening on /dropsend/setup/stash:
  • Same-origin enforcement: Origin header must match request.host.
    Closes cross-origin CSRF from another browser tab even when an
    attacker has sniffed a victim's client_id.
  • Content-Type lockdown: rejects anything other than
    application/json with HTTP 415. Closes the confused-deputy class
    where form-encoded bodies could be parsed as JSON.
  • Live-session check: client_id must correspond to an active
    PromptServer.instance.sockets entry. Returns 403 otherwise.
    Closes the stash-poisoning vector where an attacker who guesses
    a victim's client_id could pre-populate credentials.
  • Per-IP rate limit: 30 POSTs / 10-second sliding window, returns
    429 over budget. Defense against stash-spam DoS attempting to
    evict a legitimate user's entry.
  • Body cap (32 KB), client_id regex validation, JSON parse errors
    return 400, empty payloads dropped.
  • Both rate-limit and live-session checks empirically verified via
    curl smoke tests.

Reconnect now revokes the Dropbox refresh token at the source:
  • reconnect=True populates DropboxAuthManager from os.environ and
    calls reset(revoke_token=True).
  • POST /2/auth/token/revoke with an 8-second timeout so a Dropbox
    outage cannot hang the operator mid-reconnect. Local cleanup
    proceeds regardless of revocation outcome.
  • Revocation outcome is now logged at logger.error level (not just
    print) and the failure message tells the operator to manually
    disconnect at https://www.dropbox.com/account/connected_apps so
    a silent revocation failure cannot leave a still-valid token at
    Dropbox.

Logging:
  • Single FileHandler attached to the root logger from __init__.py,
    pointed at a plugin-relative dropsend.log. Replaces the four
    duplicated logging.basicConfig() blocks in monitor_output.py /
    encrypt_file.py / dropbox_upload.py / dropsend_uploader_node.py
    that were dead code (basicConfig is a no-op once ComfyUI has
    already configured root). Log records from every DropSend module
    now actually persist to disk.
  • Race-free creation: pre-create with os.open(O_CREAT | O_WRONLY |
    O_APPEND, 0o600) before FileHandler attaches, follow-up chmod as
    belt-and-suspenders. Closes the brief default-umask window
    between FileHandler creating the file and post-hoc chmod.
  • Rotation via RotatingFileHandler (5 MB per file, 3 backups, ~20
    MB max). Bounds disk use on long-lived hosts.
  • dropbox_auth_manager.py now has its own logger so revocation
    successes/failures land in dropsend.log alongside stdout.

Tests (tests/ directory, unittest, no extra deps):
  • test_safe_paths.py — 23 tests covering symlink rejection, path-
    traversal rejection, allowlist behaviour, dropbox_dest validation
    (NUL bytes, missing leading slash, parent-traversal segments),
    and resolve_safe_watch_folder edge cases. safe_paths is the only
    barrier between remote workflow inputs and arbitrary-file-read
    on the host; this is regression coverage for that barrier.
  • test_setup_node_security.py — static AST analysis of
    dropsend_setup_node.py asserting that every send_sync call for a
    credential event passes a non-None sid AND sits inside an
    "if sid:" guard. Catches future regressions of the original
    WebSocket-broadcast vulnerability deterministically. Also asserts
    INPUT_TYPES never re-introduces app_key/app_secret/auth_code.

WebSocket-broadcast guard maintained on all three event sites
(dropsend_credentials_ready, dropbox_reconnect_complete,
dropsend_credentials_needed) — refuse to send when client_id is None
to prevent send_sync(..., None) from broadcasting credentials to
every connected browser tab.

README:
  • New Changelog section documenting the v1.1.0 security advisory
    (workflow-persistence + WS-broadcast leaks in earlier versions)
    and the fixes shipped in this release.
  • New "Bind ComfyUI to localhost or front it with auth" Best
    Practice item (item 4) explicitly calling out that ComfyUI's
    /prompt endpoint is unauthenticated.
  • New "Encryption key rotation" subsection covering symmetric-key
    implications, leaked-key recovery, and how to generate a new key.
  • New "Uninstalling / disconnecting" subsection with step-by-step
    instructions for revoking Dropbox app, resetting app secret,
    removing platform secrets, and handling existing .enc files.
  • Threat model reflects same-origin/Content-Type checks, log
    rotation, plugin-directory metadata-leak note for multi-tenant
    hosts, reconnect-revocation silent-failure note, and Dropbox
    SDK error-message log review.

.gitignore:
  • Expanded to cover *.bak, *.enc, *.key/.pem/.p12/.pfx, .idea/,
    .pytest_cache/, build artifacts, Thumbs.db/Desktop.ini.

Bundled in this minor release:
  • Single-Observer fix for the macOS _fsevents conflict that
    previously prevented .enc files from being picked up by the
    upload watcher.
  • folder_format dropdown for AutoUploader (project_name default
    plus five worldwide date formats), with two-base persistence so
    switching between project-name and dated modes preserves both
    patterns.
  • RUNNING banner with per-setting plain-English explanations.
  • Branded watching/encrypted/sent log emojis.
  • Per-shell copy-paste commands and echo verification for the
    COMFYUI_DROPSEND_ALLOW_SETUP gate.
2026-05-09 05:44:47 -07:00

138 lines
5.7 KiB
Python

# ComfyUI_DropSendNode/monitor_output.py
import os
import time
import threading
import logging
from queue import Queue
from watchdog.observers import Observer
from watchdog.events import FileSystemEventHandler
from .dropbox_upload import upload_to_dropbox
from .encrypt_file import ENCRYPT_EXTENSIONS
from .safe_paths import is_safe_event_path
# Logging is configured by the package __init__ — see __init__.py for
# the FileHandler attached to the root logger. logging.getLogger here
# returns a child logger that propagates to root and inherits its
# handlers (file + ComfyUI's own stdout).
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
watcher_observer = None
watcher_handler = None
encryption_enabled = False
_stop_queue_processor = False # Stop signal for queue processor
def wait_for_complete_write(file_path, timeout=10):
last_size = -1
stable_count = 0
checks = 0
while checks < timeout * 2:
try:
current_size = os.path.getsize(file_path)
if current_size == last_size:
stable_count += 1
if stable_count >= 2:
return True
else:
stable_count = 0
last_size = current_size
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
time.sleep(0.5)
checks += 1
logger.warning(f"Timeout: File may still be writing: {file_path}")
return False
def stop_queue_processor():
"""Signal the queue processor to stop."""
global _stop_queue_processor
_stop_queue_processor = True
logger.info("Signaled upload queue processor to stop")
class NewFileHandler(FileSystemEventHandler):
def __init__(self, dropbox_dest_folder, delete_enc=False):
super().__init__()
self.dropbox_dest_folder = dropbox_dest_folder
self.delete_enc = delete_enc
self.file_queue = Queue()
self.start_queue_processor()
def on_created(self, event):
if event.is_directory:
return
file_path = event.src_path
# Defense-in-depth: refuse symlinks or paths whose realpath escapes
# the allowed output roots. The watch_folder input is already
# clamped, but Watchdog follows symlinks placed inside the watched
# tree, so without this check a `output/leak.png -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa`
# would still get uploaded.
if not is_safe_event_path(file_path):
logger.warning(f"Skipping unsafe path (symlink or outside output root): {file_path}")
return
if encryption_enabled and not file_path.lower().endswith('.enc'):
logger.info(f"Skipping non-.enc file (encryption enabled): {file_path}")
return
if not encryption_enabled and file_path.lower().endswith('.enc'):
logger.info(f"Skipping .enc file (encryption disabled): {file_path}")
return
logger.info(f"Detected new file: {file_path}")
self.file_queue.put(file_path)
def start_queue_processor(self):
def process_queue():
while not _stop_queue_processor:
if not self.file_queue.empty():
file_path = self.file_queue.get()
if wait_for_complete_write(file_path):
try:
if upload_to_dropbox(file_path, self.dropbox_dest_folder):
if self.delete_enc and file_path.lower().endswith('.enc'):
os.remove(file_path)
logger.info(f"Deleted .enc file after upload: {file_path}")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Upload failed: {e}")
self.file_queue.put(file_path) # Requeue on failure
time.sleep(0.1) # Small delay to avoid CPU overload
logger.info("Upload queue processor stopped")
threading.Thread(target=process_queue, daemon=True).start()
def start_monitoring(watch_folder, dropbox_dest_folder, enable_encryption=False, delete_enc=False, subfolder_monitor=True, encrypt_handler=None):
global watcher_observer, watcher_handler, encryption_enabled, _stop_queue_processor
encryption_enabled = enable_encryption
_stop_queue_processor = False # Reset stop signal when starting
if watcher_observer and watcher_observer.is_alive():
logger.info("Restarting monitor to update settings.")
watcher_observer.stop()
watcher_observer.join()
watcher_handler = NewFileHandler(dropbox_dest_folder, delete_enc)
watcher_observer = Observer()
watcher_observer.schedule(watcher_handler, watch_folder, recursive=subfolder_monitor)
# macOS's _fsevents C extension maintains a global registry of watched
# paths and refuses a second watch on the same path with a
# "Cannot add watch ... it is already scheduled" RuntimeError that
# crashes the second Observer's emitter thread silently. So when
# encryption is enabled, register the encrypt handler on the SAME
# Observer (watchdog supports multiple handlers per observer and
# dispatches every event to every handler).
if encrypt_handler is not None:
watcher_observer.schedule(encrypt_handler, watch_folder, recursive=subfolder_monitor)
watcher_observer.start()
logger.info(f"📦👀 Watching: {watch_folder} (Subfolder_Monitor: {'Yes' if subfolder_monitor else 'No'})")
logger.info(f"Upload target: {dropbox_dest_folder}")
logger.info(f"Encryption enabled: {'Yes' if encryption_enabled else 'No'}")
def keep_alive():
try:
while True:
time.sleep(1)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
watcher_observer.stop()
watcher_observer.join()
threading.Thread(target=keep_alive, daemon=True).start()